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Regulation of international merchant shipping is predominantly carried out by global bodies, of 
which the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is the most prominent. The U.N. 
Convention on the Law of the Sea nevertheless explicitly or implicitly allows (limited) unilateral 
prescription by flag, coastal and port states as well as the exercise of these rights collectively at 
the regional level. Some IMO instruments acknowledge the right to impose more stringent 
standards and others even encourage regional action. Moreover, while the mandate and practice 
of the IMO have expanded significantly since its establishment in 1958, further expansion is 
subject to constraints. This article will explore various options for regional regulation of 
merchant shipping outside IMO. Special attention will be given to such options in the Arctic 
region in the context of the efforts within IMO regarding the adoption of the Mandatory Code for 
Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code). 
 









Regulation of international merchant shipping is predominantly carried out by global bodies, of 
which the International Maritime Organization (IMO) is unquestionably the most prominent. The 
pre-eminence of global bodies is a direct consequence of the global nature of international 
merchant shipping and the interest of the internatio l community in globally uniform minimum 
regulation. This interest and the importance of globa  bodies are safeguarded in several ways by 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(LOS Convention).1  
However, national regulation is not always confined to implementation of standards set by 
global bodies. As this article will show, the LOS Convention explicitly allows unilateral 
prescription by coastal states and implicitly by port and flag states. Moreover, nothing in the 
LOS Convention prevents states from exercising these rights collectively at the regional level. 
Some IMO instruments acknowledge the right to impose more stringent standards and others 
even encourage regional action. While the mandate and practice of the IMO have expanded 
significantly since its establishment in 1958, further expansion is subject to constraints and also 
does not impact on the prescriptive jurisdiction of states under (the) international law (of the 
sea). In light of these considerations, this article will explore various options for regional 
regulation of merchant shipping outside the IMO. Special attention will be given to such options 
in the Arctic region in the context of the efforts within the IMO towards the adoption of the 
Mandatory Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code).2 At the time of writing, the 
Polar Code was likely to be adopted by the end of 2014 and to enter into force in 2015 or 2016. 
For the purpose of this article, Arctic marine shipping is regarded as the shipping that occurs 
or could occur in the marine Arctic. As there is no generally accepted geographical definition of 
the term Arctic, for the purposes here it has an identical meaning as the term “AMAP area” 
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adopted by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) working group of the 
Arctic Council.3 The Arctic Ocean is defined as the marine waters no th of the Bering Strait and 
north of Greenland and Svalbard, excluding the Barents Sea. The high seas area in the Arctic 
Ocean is referred to as the Central Arctic Ocean. Five states have coasts on the Arctic Ocean, 
Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States. These 
Arctic Five are also known as the Arctic Ocean coastal states. The three other members of the 
Arctic Council4 - Iceland, Finland and Sweden - are Arctic states by virtue of their membership. 
Of these three, only Iceland is an Arctic coastal st te as it is situated within the marine Arctic. 
 Arctic marine shipping can be intra-Arctic or trans-Arctic. Trans-Arctic marine shipping can 
take place by means of various routes and combinatio s of routes. Two of these routes are the 
Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Route. The “official” Northern Sea Route encompasses 
all routes across the Russian Arctic coastal seas from Kara Gate (at the southern tip of Novaya 
Zemlya) to the Bering Strait.5 The Northwest Passage is not defined in Canadian law but is the 
name commonly given to the marine routes between th A lantic and Pacific Oceans along the 
northern coast of North America that span the strait  nd sounds within the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago. Pharand identifies seven main routes, with minor variations.6 A future alternative to 
all these routes is the Central Arctic Ocean Route, which runs straight across the middle of the 
Central Arctic Ocean. 
 The discussion in this article is structured into three sections: the International Legal Regime 
for Merchant Shipping; the Mandate and Practice of the IMOMandate and Practice of the IMO; 
and Options for Regional Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Arctic Region. A final section 
offers a summary and highlights the main conclusions. 
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International Legal Regime for Merchant Shipping  
Introduction 
The international legal regime for merchant shipping seeks to safeguard the different interests of 
the international community as a whole with those of states that have rights, obligations or 
jurisdiction in their capacities as flag, coastal, or port states or with respect to their natural and
legal persons. While the term flag state is commonly defined as the state in which a vessel is 
registered and/or whose flag it flies,7 there are no generally accepted definitions for the terms 
coastal state or port state. For the purposes of this article, the term coastal state refers to the 
rights, obligations, and jurisdiction of a state within its own maritime zones over foreign vessels. 
Finally, the term port state refers to the rights, obligations and jurisdiction of a state over foreign 
vessels that are voluntarily in one of its ports. In order to avoid an overlap with jurisdiction by 
coastal states, port state jurisdiction is regarded as relating to illegal discharges by foreign 
vessels beyond the coastal state’s maritime zones, non-compliance with conditions for entry into 
port, and acts within port. 
 The jurisdictional framework relating to vessel-source pollution laid down in the LOS 
Convention is predominantly aimed at flag and coastal states. Apart from one explicit provision,8 
the Convention deals only implicitly with port state jurisdiction (see subsection below – Port 
State JurisdictionPort State Jurisdiction). Prescriptive jurisdiction by flag and coastal states is 
linked by means of rules of reference to the notion of “generally accepted international rules and 
standards” (GAIRAS). These refer to the technical rules and standards laid down in instruments 
adopted by regulatory bodies, in particular the IMO. It is likely that the rules and standards laid 




The basic duty for flag states to exercise effectiv jurisdiction and control over ships flying 
their flag as laid down in Article 94 of the LOS Convention is further specified in Article 211(2), 
which stipulates that flag state prescriptive jurisdiction over vessel-source pollution is mandatory 
and must at least be at the same level as GAIRAS. While flag states can choose to require their 
vessels to comply with more stringent standards than GAIRAS, this will impact on their 
competitiveness. 
This mandatory minimum level of flag state prescriptive jurisdiction established by the LOS 
Convention is balanced by according the vessels of all states the following navigational rights: 
• the right of innocent passage, suspendable or non-suspendable, in territorial seas, 
archipelagic waters outside routes normally used for international navigation or, if 
designated, archipelagic sea lanes, internal waters pur uant to Article 8(2) of the LOS 
Convention, and certain straits used for international navigation; 
• the right of transit passage in straits used for international navigation; 
• the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage within routes normally used for international 
navigation or, if designated, archipelagic sea lanes; and 
• the freedom of navigation within exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and on the high seas. 
Coastal state prescriptive jurisdiction over vessel- ource pollution is optional under the LOS 
Convention but, if exercised, cannot be more stringent than the level of GAIRAS.10 This 
restriction applies only in relation to pollution of the marine environment, as defined in Article 
1(1)(4) of the LOS Convention, but not where coastal t te jurisdiction is exercised for another 
purpose, for instance, for the conservation of marine living resources. As regards anchoring, this 
view is supported by practice of the United States and, more recently, the Netherlands which 
regulates anchoring beyond the territorial sea withou  seeking IMO approval, and apparently not 
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objected (any longer) by other states.11 As regards ballast water discharges, the above view is 
supported by the fact that, instead of a new Annex to the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL 73/78),12 the IMO decided to deal with ballast 
water management in a stand-alone treaty, the Ballast W ter Management (BWM) Convention.13 
Moreover, the BWM Convention allows states, individually or in concert, to regulate more 
stringently above the minimum ballast water exchange level laid down in the Convention.14 
Straits Used for International Navigation 
The general rule on coastal state prescriptive jurisdiction mentioned in the previous subsection is 
also applicable to marine areas where the right of transit passage applies.15 This regime was 
developed for international straits that would no longer have a high seas corridor once strait 
states had extended the breadth of their territorial seas to 12 nautical miles (nm). The 
applicability of the regime of transit passage is nevertheless dependent on various conditions. 
One of these conditions is laid down in Article 37 and stipulates that the regime of transit 
passage only applies to “straits which are used for international navigation”. Diverging views 
exist on the words “are used”, whose normal meaning points to actual and not potential usage. 
Nevertheless, the latter view is adhered to by the United States, which takes the view that “the 
term ‘used for international navigation’ includes all straits capable of being used for international 
navigation”.16 Conversely, Canada and the Russian Federation take the view that the words refer 
to actual usage, and most commentators support this interpretation.17 Close reading of the 
judgment of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channel Case;18 from which the 
phrase originates, reveals that it also touches on potential usage.19 
Consistent with its above view on potential usage, th  United States regards the Northwest 
Passage and parts of the Northern Sea Route as strait used for international navigation subject to 
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the regime of transit passage.20 None of the European Union’s (EU) Arctic policy statements in 
recent years contain a position on the issue, even though the 2009 EU Council “conclusions on 
Arctic issues” mention transit passage.21 However, one would assume that at least some states 
with large fleets engaged in international shipping or with a special interest in Arctic shipping, 
for instance China, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and several EU Member States, share the view 
of the United States. 
Consistent with its above view on actual usage, Canad  does not regard the Northwest 
Passage as a strait used for international navigation. Canada combines this position with two 
other positions. First, that the waters within its Arctic archipelago enclosed by its 1985 straight 
baselines22 are internal waters based on historic title.23 As a corollary, it may be argued that the 
right of innocent passage pursuant to Article 8(2) of the LOS Convention does not apply.24 Both 
the United States and the then European Community (EC) Member States lodged diplomatic 
protests against the 1985 straight baselines, regarding them as inconsistent with international law 
and explicitly rejecting that historic title could provide an adequate justification.25 Second, 
Canada takes the view that even if the transit passage regime would apply, it would be trumped 
by Article 234 of the LOS Convention (see subsection below - Unilateral Coastal State 
PrescriptionUnilateral Coastal State Prescription). 
Despite their bilateral 1988 Agreement on Arctic Cooperation,26 which deals only with 
icebreaker navigation, the dispute between Canada an  the United States on the legal status of 
the Northwest Passage and the applicable regime of navigation remains unresolved. The broad 
saving-clause in section 4 of the 1988 Agreement indicates that it should above all be regarded as 
an agreement-to-disagree. The 2010 debates within the IMO on Canada’s mandatory Northern 
Canada Vessel Traffic Services (NORDREG) Regulations,27 which focus predominantly on 
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Article 234 of the LOS Convention, are further proof that their dispute remains unresolved (see 
subsection below – Unilateral Coastal State PrescriptionUnilateral Coastal State Prescription). 
The position of the Russian Federation on the Northern Sea Route seems largely similar to 
that of Canada and consists of combined positions on actual usage, internal waters included 
within straight baselines pursuant to historic title, and transit passage being trumped by Article 
234.28 
Unilateral Coastal State Prescription 
There are three well known exceptions to the above-mentioned general rule that coastal state 
prescription cannot be more stringent than GAIRAS. First, as general international law does not 
grant foreign vessels navigational rights in internal waters, apart from a minor exception laid 
down in Article 8(2) of the LOS Convention, coastal state prescriptive jurisdiction is in principle 
unrestricted. The observations on port state jurisdiction below apply therefore mutatis mutandis 
to internal waters. 
Second, pursuant to Article 211(2) of the LOS Convention, a coastal state is entitled to 
prescribe more stringent (unilateral) standards for the territorial sea and archipelagic waters 
provided they “shall not apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign ships 
unless they are giving effect to generally accepted international rules or standards”. Unilateral 
discharge, navigation, and ballast water management sta dards are, among others, therefore 
allowed. The rationale is to safeguard the objectiv of globally uniform international minimum 
regulation, which would be undermined if states unilaterally prescribed standards that have 
significant extra-territorial effects. 
A third exception is laid down in Article 234 of the LOS Convention. It is entitled Ice-




Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels 
in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where 
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas 
for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible 
disturbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due 
regard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
based on the best available scientific evidence. 
 
Article 234 was included in the LOS Convention as a result of in particular the efforts of Canada, 
which sought to ensure that its 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA)29 and 
underlying regulations and orders would no longer be egarded as inconsistent with international 
law. The negotiations on Article 234 were predominantly conducted by Canada, the Soviet 
Union, and the United States and were closely connected to what eventually became Article 
211(6) on special areas.30 
While Article 234 contains a number of ambiguities, not unlike many other provisions in the 
LOS Convention, the basic purpose is to provide a co stal state with broader prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction in ice-covered areas than in maritime zones elsewhere. In particular, in 
contrast with Article 211(6) on special areas, Article 234 does not envisage a role for the 
“competent international organization” (primarily the IMO) where the coastal state takes the 
view that more stringent standards than GAIRAS are ne ded. 
As the wording of Article 234 indicates, however, jurisdiction is subject to several 
restrictions and can only be exercised for a specified purpose. One such restriction follows from 
the words “for most of the year”. Decreasing ice-coverage will mean that, gradually, fewer states 
will be able to rely on Article 234 in fewer areas. As regards the phrase “within the limits of the 
exclusive economic zone,” it is submitted that the better interpretation is that this is merely 
meant to indicate the outer limits of the EEZ but not to exclude the territorial sea.31 
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The purpose for which jurisdiction can be exercised pursuant to Article 234 is “the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels.” Even though navigation is 
mentioned twice in Article 234, it does not explicit y grant jurisdiction for the purpose of 
ensuring maritime safety. It is nevertheless submitted hat Article 234 allows regulations that 
have environmental protection as primary purpose and maritime safety as secondary purpose as 
well as regulations for which both purposes are more or less equally important.32 
The LOS Convention does not explicitly address the sc nario of waters that are both ice-
covered and subject to the regime of transit passage, but many commentators argue that the 
inclusion of the stand-alone Article 234 in the separate Section 8 of Part XII supports the 
dominance of Article 234 over transit passage.33 While the International Chamber of Shipping 
(ICS) supported the opposite view in 2012,34 the United States does not seem to have publicly 
stated that transit passage trumps Article 234, even though this might be its position.35 There 
may be several reasons for this, including the fact that the United States is not a party to the LOS 
Convention, awareness that its position is not very st ong, and a preference for a cooperative 
rather than a confrontational stance. 
The following states would currently be entitled to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 
234: Canada; Denmark (in relation to Greenland); Norway (in relation to Svalbard but subject to 
the Spitsbergen Treaty36); the Russian Federation; and the United States. So far only Canada and 
the Russian Federation have actually exercised such jurisdiction.37 The Kingdom of Denmark’s 
2011 “Strategy for the Arctic” refers to Denmark’s willingness to invoke Article 234 if adequate 
standards cannot be adopted within the IMO.38 
The consistency of the national laws and regulations f Canada and the Russian Federation 
with international law has been questioned from time to time. For instance: the applicability of 
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certain construction, design, equipment and manning (CDEM) standards to foreign warships and 
other governmental vessels (re Canada); discriminatory navigation requirements, icebreaker fees, 
and insurance requirements; lack of transparency; and high levels of bureaucracy (primarily re 
Russian Federation, even if not stated).39 
The consistency of Canada’s NORDREG Regulations with Article 234 of the LOS 
Convention was debated within IMO’s Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation (NAV) (56th 
Session)40 and the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) (88th Session)41 in 2010.42 Canada 
introduced the voluntary NORDREG system in 1977 but decided to make it mandatory as a 
consequence of Canada’s 2009 Northern Strategy.43 The NORDREG Regulations became 
mandatory on 1 July 2010 within the extended (200 nm) scope of the AWPPA, and therefore 
have a much wider scope than the Northwest Passage. The cornerstone of the NORDREG 
Regulations is the requirement for prescribed vessels, whether domestic or foreign, to submit, 
prior to entering the NORDREG Zone, certain information and to obtain clearance.44 
Contravention of these requirements could lead to the vessel’s detention and the imposition of a 
fine and/or imprisonment,45 but none of these sanctions seem to have been imposed at the time of 
writing.46 The NORDREG Regulations were enacted pursuant to the 2001 Canada Shipping Act, 
whose objectives include marine environmental protection.47 
At MSC 88, the debate centered mainly around the question whether or not Canada was 
required to seek IMO approval before imposing the NORDREG Regulations on foreign vessels. 
The United States argued that IMO approval was necessary because in its view the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 74)48 and associated instruments did not 
provide an adequate basis for imposing the NORDREG Regulations unilaterally. No reference 
was made to Article 234 or the international law of the sea as such, even though the United 
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States made such latter references at NAV 56 and in its diplomatic notes to Canada.49 The 
requirement in the NORDREG Regulations to obtain clearance is probably the most troublesome 
for the United States, among other things because it essentially amounts to the need for prior 
authorization and could have precedent-setting effects in other scenarios where a coastal state 
argues it has a right to request prior notification or authorization, in particular in relation to 
waters which the United States regards to be subject to the regime of transit passage. The 
Russian Federation’s requirement for ships navigatin  he Northern Sea Route to apply for a 
license would raise similar concerns.50  
At MSC 88, the United States was in particular supported by interventions from Germany 
and Singapore. While the former closely followed the United States position, the latter explicitly 
viewed Canada’s actions as inconsistent with the LOS Convention.51 Prior to MSC 88, France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, and presumably other states as well, had sent Notes Verbales 
to Canada.52 Before the United Kingdom issued its Note Verbale, it approached the European 
Commission to verify if the Commission would be willing to issue a Note Verbale. The 
Commission declined, in part because it felt that it was not evident that Canada’s actions 
warranted a diplomatic protest and in part also due to concerns that a diplomatic protest could 
compromise the EU’s more important interests in cooperation with Arctic states within and 
outside the Arctic Council.53  
Canada - supported among others by Norway and the Russian Federation - took the view at 
MSC 88 that IMO approval was unnecessary as Article 234 provided an adequate basis. While 
the debates within the IMO were inconclusive and have not resurfaced, they illustrate that more 
states than just the United States are concerned about navigational rights and coastal state 
jurisdiction over shipping in ice-covered areas andpotential precedent-setting effects elsewhere. 
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Port State Jurisdiction 
As ports lie wholly within a state’s territory and fall on that account under its territorial 
sovereignty, customary international law acknowledges that a port state has wide discretion in 
exercising jurisdiction over its ports. This was explicitly stated by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case, 
where it observed that it is “by virtue of its sovereignty, that the coastal state may regulate access 
to its ports”.54 While there may often be a presumption that access to port will be granted, 
customary international law gives foreign vessels no general right of access to ports.55 Articles 
25(2), 38(2), 211(3), and 255 of the LOS Convention implicitly confirm the absence of a right of 
access for foreign vessels to ports as well as the port state’s wide discretion in exercising 
jurisdiction under customary international law. This so-called residual jurisdiction is also 
recognized in several IMO instruments and has on some important occasions been exercised by 
the United States and the EU. Nevertheless, some exceptions apply, for instance in case of force 
majeure and distress, and uncertainties exist, for instance on the implications of international 
trade law. International law only rarely authorizes port states to impose enforcement measures 
that are more stringent than denial of access or use of port (services) for extra-territorial 
behavior.56 Article 218 of the LOS Convention is one of these instances. This provision gives 
port states enforcement jurisdiction over illegal discharges beyond their own maritime zones, 
namely the high seas and the maritime zones of other s ates. 
Mandate and Practice of the IMO 
Introduction 
A large number of global, (sub-)regional and bilater l instruments and bodies either implement 
the LOS Convention and its two implementation agreem nts,57 complement them, or do both. 
The LOS Convention and its implementation agreements are to a large extent framework 
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conventions and in many areas do not contain the substantive standards necessary for actual 
regulation (for example, maritime safety standards or fisheries conservation and management 
measures) or, except for the International Seabed Authority (ISA), establish regulatory bodies 
with a mandate to do so. To ensure implementation at the appropriate level, the LOS Convention 
and its implementation agreements acknowledge the competence of pre-existing global or 
regional instruments and bodies, impose obligations  states to cooperate and agree on 
regulations through them, and encourage the adoption and establishment of new instruments and 
bodies.58 
 While pre-existing international bodies are occasionally mentioned by name,59 it is more 
common for the LOS Convention to use non-specific references to “competent” or “relevant” 
international organizations or similar wording. This acknowledges not only that more than one 
pre-existing international body may have competence i  certain scenarios, but also that the 
mandates of international bodies may develop over time, and that new international bodies may 
be established.60 
 Even though the IMO is only explicitly mentioned once in the LOS Convention,61 it is 
generally accepted that the IMO is the primary competent international organization for the 
regulation of international merchant shipping.62 At the same time, however, the IMO is not the 
only competent international organization for this sector.63 Both the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have a long-lasting and 
widely recognized standard-setting role.64 Moreover, several international organizations, such as, 
the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) are “competent” as well, even though not for the purposes of standard-setting. Rather, 
the information and services provided by and through them, safeguard and facilitate safe 
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shipping as well as provide the scientific basis for standard-setting by other organizations.65 
Lastly, reference must be made to the important role in the merchant shipping sector of self-
regulation by international non-governmental bodies, for instance the International Association 
of Classification Societies (IACS).66 
Mandate in the IMO Convention and Subsequent Evolution 
The IMO was established in 1958 pursuant to the IMO Convention67 and is a Specialized 
Agency of the United Nations “in the field of shippng and the effect of shipping on the marine 
environment”.68 The purposes of the IMO are laid down in paragraphs (a)-(e) of Article 1 of the 
IMO Convention. Paragraph (a), discussed below, has been subject to various amendments and 
its current version captures the core of IMO’s substantive mandate. Conversely, the purposes laid 
down in paragraphs (b) and (c), which relate to “discriminatory action and unnecessary 
restrictions” and “unfair restricted practices,” proved an obstacle for the entry into force of the 
IMO Convention. This was eventually overcome by tacitly agreeing to ignore these purposes 
within IMO and to address them within the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).69    
 The current version of Article 1(a) reads:  
To provide machinery for co-operation among Governme ts in the field of 
governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds 
affecting shipping engaged in international trade; to encourage and facilitate the 
general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning the 
maritime safety, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine 
pollution from ships; and to deal with administrative and legal matters related to the 
purposes set out in this Article; 
 
According to this paragraph, IMO’s substantive mandate relates to maritime safety, efficiency of 
navigation and vessel-source pollution. The most significant formal change to the IMO’s 
mandate occurred through amendments to the IMO Convention adopted in 1975. These not only 
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changed the title of the Convention and the name of the IMO, by omitting “Consultative” in 
both, but also added the phrase “prevention and control of marine pollution from ships” to 
Article 1(a), and established the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) under a 
new Part IX of the IMO Convention.70  
IMO’s mandate has continued to evolve, even though this has not been codified in the IMO 
Convention by means of new amendments. Its current mandate is, inter alia, reflected in the 
2011 Mission Statement. 
The mission of the [IMO], as a United Nations specialized agency, is to promote 
safe, secure, environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through 
cooperation. This will be accomplished by adopting he highest practicable standards 
of maritime safety and security, efficiency of navigation and prevention and control 
of pollution from ships, as well as through consideration of the related legal matters 
and effective implementation of IMO’s instruments, with a view to their universal 
and uniform application.71 
 
The different substantive components of IMO’s mandate can, to some extent, also be deduced 
from IMO’s website72 and the establishment of seven new sub-committees in 2013, which 
replaced the nine sub-committees that operated before then. Arguably, the two most important 
evolutions in IMO’s substantive mandate relate to maritime safety and vessel-source pollution.  
As regards maritime safety, it is noteworthy that the 2011 Mission Statement refers to 
maritime safety and security in tandem and thus acknowledges IMO’s extensive and expanding 
practice in relation to unlawful acts against the safety of navigation, terrorism, piracy and armed 
robbery, drugs smuggling, illegal migrants and persons rescued at sea. These substantive fields 
reflect broad support for an extensive definition of maritime security. 
As regards vessel-source pollution, it can be noted that the first sentence of the 2011 Mission 
Statement refers to “environmentally sound […] and sustainable shipping”, which reflects a 
broader substantive mandate than vessel-source pollution, referred to in the second sentence.73 
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This broader mandate gradually emerged due to IMO’s efforts with respect to, inter alia, 
anchoring, ballast water and sediments, anti-fouling systems, ship recycling and noise. 
Types of Standards 
Like the expansion of IMO’s mandate, the types of standards contained in IMO instruments 
continue to expand as well. Whereas early IMO instruments mainly contained traditional 
standards such as CDEM and discharge standards, examples of new types of standards included 
in more recent IMO instruments are ship reporting systems (SRSs), emission standards and 
ballast water treatment standards. This trend is a consequence of the overall expansion of IMO’s 
substantive mandate and the associated growing number of diverging shipping issues that the 
IMO has been asked to address, as well as the technological developments that has facilitated 
certain standards to be set. This trend on types of standards is bound to continue as it is subject to 
few restraints and exceptions. One possible constrai t may be where a standard consists of, 
contains, or amounts to, a requirement to give prior notification or obtain prior authorization for 
ships in lateral passage in the absence of prior flag state consent to such a standard. Flag states 
commonly object to such standards arguing that theyundermine their rights and freedoms of 
navigation. Canada’s NORDREG Regulations are a case in point. Some further observations are 
made in the subsection below – Constraints on the Expansion of the IMO’s MandateConstraints 
on the Expansion of IMO’s Mandate. 
Proponents of new types of standards will commonly first try to get these approved within 
the IMO, as this will make them global minimum stand rds. Failure to secure IMO approval, 
however, still leaves the option of imposing a new type of standard based on their jurisdiction as 
flag, coastal or port states as discussed above. In the context of polar shipping and the ongoing 
negotiations on the Polar Code, it is worth noting that the Polar Code is unlikely to contain 
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mandatory standards or requirements on icebreaker assist nce, convoys or fees.74 Conversely, 
these are contained in the laws and regulations of Canada an the Russian Federation and are, in 
principle, permitted by Article 234 of the LOS Conve tion. 
Proponents of a higher level of stringency of an existing type of standard have the same 
option in case IMO approval cannot be obtained. It can be noted that during the negotiations on 
the Polar Code, Canada did not secure the necessary upport for a complete prohibition of 
discharges of any garbage, including food waste under certain conditions, as incorporated in 
Canadian law.75 The fact that Canada’s preference was recorded76 suggests that Canada may 
continue to rely on Article 234 of the LOS Conventio  to impose a more stringent standard than 
that contained in the Polar Code by means of its naio l laws and regulations. A saving-clause 
in the Preamble to the Draft Polar Code underscores Canada’s entitlement to do so.77  
Fostering Compliance with IMO Instruments 
Another domain where IMO practice is continuously developing is its efforts to foster 
compliance with IMO instruments.78 The traditional mechanisms are the reporting obligations in 
various IMO instruments.79 While some IMO instruments also contain provisions on in-port 
inspection,80 and the IMO has encouraged the establishment of regional port state control (PSC) 
arrangements,81 as well as developed guidance on PSC,82 this cannot be regarded as an IMO 
mechanism as such. In-port inspection is based on customary international law and the IMO did 
not devote serious attention to PSC until the firstregional PSC arrangement, the Paris MOU,83 
had been operating for almost a decade and proven succe sful . Furthermore, while the IMO’s 
efforts at capacity-building, in particular through its Technical Co-operation Committee and its 
Integrated Technical Co-operation Programme (ITCP), also contribute to compliance, they are 
best regarded as directed primarily at fostering imple entation. 
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The first genuine IMO compliance mechanism was incorporated in the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW 78) 
through amendments adopted in 199584 that built on the reporting obligation in Article IV. 
Pursuant to Regulation I/7 of the Annex to the STCW 78 and Section A-I/7 of the STCW Code, 
parties became required to provide detailed information to the IMO on the measures taken to 
ensure compliance with the Convention, education and training courses, certification procedures 
and other factors relevant to implementation of the Convention. The information was to be 
reviewed by panels of competent persons that would report on their findings to the IMO 
Secretary-General, who, in turn, would report to the MSC which Parties to STCW 78 were fully 
compliant. The MSC would then produce the “list of c nfirmed STCW Parties” in compliance 
with the STCW 78.85 The Manila Amendments to the STCW 78 and the STCW Code adopted in 
2010 develop and strengthen this mechanism further.86 
Additional compliance mechanisms were developed by the MSC’s Sub-Committee on Flag 
State Implementation (FSI), including the “Self-Asse ment of Flag State Performance” in 
199987 and the “Voluntary IMO Member State Audit Scheme” in 2005.88 While both are 
voluntary, the latter mechanism involves a third party nd covers not only obligations of IMO 
members in their capacities as flag states but also as coastal and port states. This broad focus is 
also reflected in the decision to replace the FSI by the Sub-Committee on Implementation of 
IMO Instruments (III). In 2009, the IMO decided to work towards a mandatory or 
institutionalized Audit Scheme and by the end of 2013 it was expected that the required 
amendments to legally binding IMO instruments would enter into force in the coming years.89 
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Constraints on the Expansion of the IMO’s Mandate 
While the discussion above has highlighted the gradual expansion of the IMO’s mandate, 
whether or not codified in the IMO Convention, this does not mean that there are no constraints 
on further expansion. One of the most important constraints is the mandates of other global 
bodies. An expansion of the IMO’s mandate which would create an overlap with a mandate of 
another global body is unlikely to find support within the international community. This is 
particularly evident if the expansion could lead to incompatibility or conflict with the output of 
other global bodies. Conversely, expansion into domains that are within the mandate of another 
global body but that have not been used, may attract support. A good example of the latter is the 
IMO’s mandate relating to “discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions” and “unfair 
restricted practices”, which has remained unused by IMO, but has been taken up by UNCTAD.90  
 Another constraint on the expansion of the IMO’s mandate is the domain of the (overarching 
regime of the) international law of the sea, including the LOS Convention. As this domain is 
generally accepted to be part of the mandate of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
this constraint can also be seen as part of the constrai t relating to the mandates of other global 
bodies discussed just above. However, in view of the IMO’s implementation role under the LOS 
Convention and the fact that the Convention does not explicitly establish a mandate for the 
UNGA or the Meetings of States Parties to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(SPLOS),91 it is not always clear if the IMO “intrudes” into he domain of the international law 
of the sea or not. As decision-making within the IMO is in principle based on consensus, 
however, one single state which takes the view that IMO so intrudes or not may be enough. This 
explains, for instance, why the United States took care to ensure that the debate on the 
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NORDREG Regulations within MSC 88 in 2010 centered on compliance with SOLAS 74 rather 
than on the interpretation or application of Article 234 of the LOS Convention.92 
 IMO’s implementation role under the LOS Convention can either be implicit – namely 
through the flag and coastal state obligations linked to rules of reference and GAIRAS - or 
explicit, for instance in relation to the designation of sea lanes and traffic separation schemes in 
straits used for international navigation and archipelagic waters.93 These latter provisions 
establish so-called “cooperative legislative competence” between the IMO and the relevant strait 
or archipelagic states. Despite the absence of an explicit basis in the LOS Convention, however, 
the IMO has also developed similar mechanisms for mandatory ships’ routeing measures and 
ship reporting systems (SRSs) beyond the territorial se . Even though these new mechanisms 
involve a need for IMO approval, and thereby implied flag state consent through their IMO 
membership, it cannot be denied that they create limited coastal state jurisdiction without an 
explicit basis in the LOS Convention and thereby adjust the jurisdictional balance within the 
Convention.94  
These new mechanisms attracted support within the IMO, but it is not difficult to imagine 
opposition from states in different scenarios on the ground of intrusion into the domain of the 
international law of the sea.95 One example relates to Turkey’s 1994 decision to commence 
regulation of the Straits of Istanbul and Cannakale and the Marmara Sea (Turkish Straits), which 
are in principle not subject to the LOS Convention’s regime of transit passage due to Article 
35(c) of the LOS Convention in conjunction with the Montreux Convention.96 As the Montreux 
Convention does not contain regulations on the safety of navigation and environmental 
protection, Turkey argued that it retained jurisdiction for these purposes pursuant to the general 
international law of the sea. Conversely, most, if not all, other IMO members took the view that 
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strait states have no unilateral jurisdiction in this scenario and that the abovementioned 
mechanism of cooperative legislative competence applies. Five years of consultations within the 
IMO did not succeed in bringing Turkey’s legislation into full conformity with tailor-made IMO 
instruments on navigation in the Turkish Straits. In essence, Turkey disagreed that cooperative 
legislative competence applied.97  
The applicability of the mechanism of cooperative legislative competence was also at the 
heart of the debate following the 2003 joint Australia-Papua New Guinea proposals to the IMO 
to designate the Torres Strait as an extension of the Great Barrier Reef particularly sensitive sea 
area (PSSA), complemented with compulsory pilotage s an associated protective measure 
(APM). A 2005 MEPC Resolution approved the PSSA extension but merely recommended 
governments to “inform ships flying their flag that they should act in accordance with Australia’s 
system of pilotage”.98 Despite this non-mandatory wording, Australia issued a Marine Notice 
which stipulated that non-compliance with its compulsory pilotage system by foreign vessels 
would lead to the imposition of non-custodial penalties in port or, for ships in transit, at the next 
port of call in Australia.99 Australia thereby intended to circumvent the need for IMO approval 
by exercising port state jurisdiction. Between 2006-2 08 several states, including the United 
States and Singapore, repeatedly took the view within t e IMO and at the UNGA that such 
sanctions would be inconsistent with the 2005 MEPC Resolution and the LOS Convention.100 At 
the same time, however, these states strongly encouraged their vessels to use pilotage in the 
Torres Strait.101 Subsequently, Australia issued Marine Notice 07/2009, which stipulates that 
non-compliance triggers a “risk” of prosecution. Classified United States embassy cables 
disclosed by WikiLeaks in 2011 suggest that these changes were the result of diplomatic 
consultations between Australia and the United States.102 In September 2013, Australian 
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authorities advised that no instances of non-compliance had occurred since issuing Marine 
Notice 8/2006.103 As Australia has never actually denied access to port, either immediately or at 
a next call, or imposed non-custodial penalties fornon-compliance with the pilotage 
requirements, its practice on port state enforcement jurisdiction does not challenge the 
applicability of the mechanism of cooperative legislat ve competence. The similarities between 
this Australian practice and Canada’s practice on enforcing its NORDREG Regulations are 
worth noting.  
A final example of a debate within the IMO related o the domain of the international law of 
the sea concerns the right of coastal states to request prior notification or authorization for ships 
carrying hazardous cargoes in lateral passage throug  their maritime zones. The debate within 
the IMO resulted in a deadlock,104 just like earlier debates outside the IMO on such rig ts over 
warships and ships carrying hazardous waste.105  
Options for Regional Regulation of Merchant Shipping in the Arctic Region 
Introduction 
The section International Legal Regime for Merchant Shipping above has shown that the LOS 
Convention explicitly allows unilateral coastal state prescription in several scenarios and 
implicitly acknowledges the residual prescriptive jurisdiction of port states pursuant to 
customary international law. It is also clear that fl g states can decide to impose more stringent 
standards than GAIRAS on their vessels. Nothing in the LOS Convention prevents coastal, port 
or flag states from exercising these rights collectiv ly at the regional level. The legality of 
regional port state prescriptive jurisdiction is acknowledged by Article 211(3) of the LOS 
Convention, which merely requires regional states to give due publicity to such action. The EU is 
an example of a regional actor that has exercised (residual) jurisdiction in all three capacities.106 
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An example of a flag state regional approach is Annex IV, “Prevention of Marine Pollution,” of 
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty.107  
 It is understandable that the official position by IMO members on regional regulation is that 
this should be avoided in view of the risk it poses to the IMO’s authority.108 Such a risk is not 
posed by regional implementation of certain IMO instruments which explicitly allow or 
encourage such implementation. This has led the Arctic Council to facilitate efforts for the 
regional implementation of the IMO’s International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue109 by means of the Arctic SAR Agreement110 and regional implementation of IMO’s 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparednss, Response and Cooperation111 and the 
International Convention relating to the Interventio  on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties112 by means of the Arctic MOPPR Agreement.113 Moreover, as demonstrated in the 
section above Mandate and Practice of the IMOMandate and Practice of IMO, there are several 
areas for which regional action would not lead to incompatibility or conflict with IMO output. 
The importance of regional action in the domain of monitoring, surveillance, inspection, and 
enforcement has, for instance, been acknowledged by the IMO in relation to regional PSC 
arrangements.114 As highlighted above, the domain of the international law of the sea is suitable 
for regional action as well. 
 The remainder of this section examines various options for regional regulation of merchant 
shipping in the Arctic region. Its subsections deal with regional PSC arrangements, the Arctic 
Council and Arctic Council System (ACS), the OSPAR Commission, and options relating to the 
domain of the international law of the sea. The latter could be pursued by the Arctic Council, the 
ACS or ad hoc groupings of states. 
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Options for Regional PSC Arrangements 
Regional PSC arrangements for merchant shipping were established to enhance compliance with 
internationally-agreed standards by means of commiten s by port state authorities to carry out 
harmonized and coordinated inspections and to take predominantly corrective enforcement 
action, i.e., detention for the purpose of rectification. The instruments in which these 
internationally agreed standards are contained are commonly referred to as “relevant 
instruments” and include the main IMO conventions such as MARPOL 73/78 and SOLAS 74.115 
A participating Maritime Authority must only apply standards that are not just in force generally 
but also for that Maritime Authority.116 Some applicability gaps can therefore be expected . 
The regional PSC arrangements are non-legally binding and, rather than states as such,  
Maritime Authorities are parties to them.117 Saving-clauses have, nevertheless, been incorporated 
in the arrangements to ensure that nothing in them affects residual port state jurisdiction, which 
includes the right to take more onerous enforcement easures.118 
The expansion of the participation in the Paris MOU and the creation and expansion of eight 
other regional PSC arrangements,119 means that almost complete global coverage has now been 
achieved. However, no such arrangement has been adopted specifically for the Arctic 
Ocean/region or the Southern Ocean/Antarctic region. S me of the advantages and disadvantages 
of an Arctic Ocean/region MOU will be discussed below, among other things in view of the 
likelihood that practically all the ships engaged in e ther intra- or trans-Arctic marine shipping 
will make use of ports subject to either the Paris MOU or the Tokyo MOU.120 None of the other 
arrangements seem relevant for Arctic marine shipping. However, when considering 
amendments to the Paris MOU it is, in light of the EU’s Directive on Port State Control,121 and 
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the need of convergence between that Directive and the Paris MOU,122 essential to obtain prior 
agreement within the EU. 
The Maritime Authorities of 27 states currently participate in the Paris MOU. (See Table 
One) 
 
 [INSERT TABLE ONE] 
 
 
The participation by the Danish Maritime Authority extends to Greenland. Moreover, even 
though the United States Coast Guard has observer status, it has been cooperating with the Paris 
MOU since at least 1986, when it first attended meetings within the Paris MOU, and the United 
States PSC system is more or less compatible with that of the Paris MOU.123 
The Paris MOU does not contain a provision that explicitly defines its spatial coverage. 
However, Section 9.2 stipulates that adherence is open for: “A Maritime Authority of a European 
coastal state and a coastal state of the North Atlantic basin from North America to Europe.” This 
has facilitated the participation or cooperation of the Maritime Authorities of all Arctic states, 
even though the description is not intended to encompass the entire marine Arctic. 
As the Maritime Authorities of both Canada and the Russian Federation also participate in 
the Tokyo MOU (see Table Two) and, in addition, theMaritime Authority of the Russian 
Federation also participates in the Black Sea MOU,124 clarity is needed as to which of their ports 
are subject to which arrangement. In 2009, Canada decided to also subject its Pacific ports to the 
Paris MOU, including the Paris MOU training requirem nts. The Pacific ports of the Russian 
Federation are currently still subject to the Tokyo MOU.125 
The Maritime Authorities of 19 states or entities currently participate in the Tokyo MOU. 
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Sections 1.2 and 8.2 of the Tokyo MOU and section 1.1 of its Annex 1, entitled 
“Membership of the Memorandum,” stipulate that the Tokyo MOU applies to the Asia-Pacific 
region, a term that is not further defined. The United States Coast Guard has observer status with 
the Tokyo MOU and cooperates in a similar way as with the Paris MOU. 
 New PSC Initiatives for the Arctic Region 
PSC initiatives could either be undertaken within the existing regional PSC arrangements or by 
establishing a new arrangement, namely an Arctic Ocean/region MOU. 
As regards possible initiatives on Arctic marine shipping within existing arrangements,126 
one approach would be to bring as much Arctic marine shipping as possible under the scope of 
the Paris MOU. This would be based on the assumption hat the stringency level and 
performance of the Paris MOU is the highest of all the regional PSC arrangements. Accordingly, 
the Russian Federation could follow Canada’s example of subjecting all its Pacific ports to the 
Paris MOU. The Paris MOU would, thereby, cover all intra-Arctic shipping and a sizeable part 
of trans-Arctic shipping, in particular if use were made of transshipment ports in the high North 
Atlantic and the high North Pacific. 
Further initiatives could also be developed within the Paris MOU. These would not relate to 
the prescription of new standards but rather would be concerned with harmonized and 
coordinated inspection, and corrective enforcement action, with respect to existing standards. 
Initiatives could be specifically tailored to ships that have engaged in Arctic marine shipping 
since their last port visit and those that will do so before their next port visit. As regards the Paris 
MOU, adjustments could be made to one or more Port State Control Committee Instructions 
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(e.g., “Guidance on Type of Inspections”) to include special guidance/instructions for inspections 
of ships that have engaged or will engage in Arctic marine shipping, as well as specific 
requirements for the qualification and training of PSC officers in this regard. Such 
guidance/instructions could also be developed by, and made applicable to, a subset of the 
Maritime Authorities that participate in, or cooperate with, the Paris MOU. 
However, unless trans-Arctic shipping makes extensive use of transshipment ports in the 
high North Pacific, departure or destination ports in the Asia-Pacific region could constitute a 
significant gap. Similar dedicated guidance/instructions on Arctic marine shipping should in that 
case therefore be developed within the Tokyo MOU. 
An alternative to developing initiatives under the Paris and Tokyo MOUs would be the 
development of an Arctic Ocean/region MOU. As participation in regional PSC arrangements is 
reserved for Maritime Authorities of the region’s coastal states, this means that the Maritime 
Authorities from the following states could be participants: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), 
Norway, the Russian Federation, the United States and, especially in case ships involved in 
Arctic marine shipping are expected to make extensive use of Icelandic ports, Iceland. 
As noted above, the Maritime Authorities from these states either already participate in, or 
cooperate with, both the Paris and Tokyo MOUs (Canad , the Russian Federation, and the 
United States) or just the Paris MOU (Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, and Norway). While the 
cost-effectiveness of regional PSC arrangements as a whole would not necessarily be negatively 
affected by further overlaps in participation, the six Maritime Authorities will have to weigh the 
costs of participating in, or cooperating with, yet another MOU against the benefits that its 
establishment would bring. This would seem to depend, among other things, on their views as to: 
the need and urgency of dedicated PSC initiatives for Arctic marine shipping; the extent to which 
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Arctic marine shipping is expected to be composed of intra-Arctic shipping and ships using 
transshipment ports in the high North Atlantic and the high North Pacific; and the prospects of 
adopting satisfactory dedicated PSC initiatives for Arctic marine shipping within the Paris or 
Tokyo MOUs.127 
Options for the Arctic Council or through the Arctic Council System 
The Arctic Council is a high-level forum established in 1996 by means of the Ottawa 
Declaration.128 The choice for a non-legally binding instrument was a clear indication that the 
Council was not intended to be an international organization and that the Council cannot adopt 
legally binding decisions or instruments as such. Te Arctic SAR Agreement and the Arctic 
MOPPR Agreement were not adopted by the Council, even though they were negotiated under 
its auspices and the Council’s 2011 and 2013 Ministerial Meetings were used as the occasion for 
their signature. 
The geographical mandate of the Arctic Council is not specified by the Ottawa Declaration, 
but can be assumed to be limited to a reasonably define  Arctic.129 The Arctic Council’s 
substantive mandate is very broad and relates to “common Arctic issues” with special reference 
to “issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”130 A footnote 
specifies that the Council “should not deal with matters related to military security”. Maritime 
shipping falls squarely under this broad mandate and this is also underlined by the fact that the 
Arctic Council has produced output that relates specifically to maritime shipping as well as less 
specific or more indirectly relevant output . 
The Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP),131 which was developed under the Protection of 
the Marine Environment (PAME) working group and is currently under revision, with adoption 
of a revised plan scheduled for the 2015 Ministerial Meeting.132 Also relevant are the Arctic SAR 
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and Arctic MOPPR Agreements, even though the Arctic SAR Agreement not only implements 
an IMO instrument but also the Convention on International Civil Aviation,133 and neither of the 
Agreements deals exclusively with shipping incidents, but also with incidents relating to air 
traffic and offshore installations. Finally, the Arctic Council’s Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group has produced a lot of relevant output as well, 
including through its important role in the negotiation-process of the Arctic MOPPR Agreement 
by developing the Operational Guidelines now included in Appendix IV to the Agreement, as 
well as through its mandate to update the Guidelines.134 
The most important Arctic Council output that focuses specifically on Arctic marine 
shipping is the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) Report, completed by PAME in 
2009.135 The AMSA Report contains 17 Recommendations categorized under the headings 
Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety, Protecting Arctic People and the Environment, and Building 
the Arctic Marine Infrastructure. Among the recommendations that have been implemented are: 
recommendation I(B), support for the updating and mandatory application of the Arctic Shipping 
Guidelines;136 recommendation I(E), which supports the negotiation of an Arctic search and 
rescue instrument; and recommendation III(C), which supports, inter alia, the development of 
circumpolar agreements on environmental response capacity. Recommendation I(B) eventually 
shaped to a considerable extent, in addition to actions undertaken within the Antarctic Treaty 
System (ATS),137 the decision to develop the mandatory Polar Code within the IMO and is, 
therefore, a good example of the Arctic Council’s so-called “decision-shaping” function.138  
As the Polar Code will ultimately be adopted by theIMO, it will be regarded as that body’s 
output and not that of the Council’s. The connection between the IMO Polar Code and the 
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Council is clearly very different from the connection between the Council and the Arctic SAR 
and Arctic MOPPR Agreements.  
This author has introduced the concept of the Arctic Council System (ACS) to clarify that 
legally binding instruments such as the Arctic SAR and Arctic MOPPR Agreements, and their 
institutional components, can be considered as part of the Council’s output even though they are 
not, and in fact could not be, formally adopted by it.139 The ACS concept consists of two basic 
components. The first is made up of the Council’s constitutive instruments, the Ottawa 
Declaration, Ministerial Declarations, and other instruments adopted by the Arctic Council, for 
instance, its Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines,140 and the Council’s institutional structure. 
The second component consists of instruments, and their institutional components, negotiated 
under the Council’s auspices. The Arctic SAR and Arctic MOPPR Agreements and their 
Meetings of the Parties envisaged under Articles 10 and 14 respectively, belong to this category.  
While the 2013 Kiruna Ministerial Meeting established four Task Forces, at the time of 
writing, it was not clear if any of these will culminate in another legally binding instrument 
through the ACS approach. Opportunities for this were identified during the Arctic Ocean 
Review (AOR) project carried out by PAME,141 but did not end up in the “Recommendations” of 
the AOR Final Report.142  
PAME has increasingly focused on shipping in recent y ars and is now mandated to explore 
the Arctic Marine Tourism Project (AMTP)143 and AOR follow-up, in addition to the AMSA 
follow-up. Special reference can be made to AMSA Report Recommendation I(C) “Uniformity 
of Arctic Shipping Governance,” which reads: 
That the Arctic states should explore the possible harmonization of Arctic marine 
shipping regulatory regimes within their own jurisdiction and uniform Arctic safety 
and environmental protection regulatory regimes, consistent with UNCLOS, that 
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could provide a basis for protection measures in regions of the central Arctic Ocean 
beyond coastal state jurisdiction for consideration by the IMO.144 
 
No steps towards implementation of this recommendation have been taken within PAME and 
little is to occur until after the adoption of the Polar Code. As the above text indicates, such steps 
do not necessarily have to be taken within the Arctic Council but can also be initiated by ad hoc 
groupings of states. 
 The Arctic Council’s initiatives in the domain of merchant shipping cannot result in output 
that is binding, legally or otherwise, on non-Members. While several key flag states have 
Observer status at the Arctic Council,145 this alone is not sufficient to bind them to Arctic 
Council output. To ensure this, a format or mechanism could be developed that allows them - 
and perhaps even other non-Members - to participate in he output’s negotiation as well as to 
express their consent to be bound. Observers and other non-Members of the Arctic Council were 
not able to participate in the negotiation of the Arctic SAR and MOPPR Agreements, despite 
expressions of interest.146 A more inclusive approach is being pursued by the Task Force for 
Action on Black Carbon and Methane (TFBCM).147  
Options for the OSPAR Commission 
The spatial mandate of the OSPAR Commission relates to the “OSPAR Maritime Area,” which 
roughly overlaps with the Atlantic sector of the marine Arctic, but about half of which extends 
further south, and includes areas within as well as beyond national jurisdiction.148 Nothing in the 
OSPAR Convention or the acts of the OSPAR Commission challenges the IMO’s primacy in the 
regulation of international merchant shipping, but also does not entirely preclude action in 
relation to merchant shipping. Article 4(2) of Annex V to the OSPAR Convention stipulates that 
Members of the OSPAR Commission can raise the need for regulatory action within the IMO 
and requires them to cooperate on the regional imple entation of IMO instruments. An example 
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of action by the OSPAR Commission in the domain of merchant shipping is the 2007 decision on 
the voluntary interim application of certain standards of the BWM Convention to ships flying the 
flag of states of the OSPAR Commission.149 In 2012, this action was replaced by joint action 
between the regional seas bodies for the Baltic,150 Mediterranean Seas151 and the OSPAR 
Commission.152 
 The limited spatial and substantive mandate of the OSPAR Commission is not the only 
reason for its unsuitability for regulating merchant shipping within the marine Arctic, however. 
The OSPAR Commission cannot impose its acts on non-members, and also has no intention to 
do so. Three of the five Arctic Ocean coastal state, Canada, the Russian Federation and the 
United States, are not members and their accession to the OSPAR Convention is unlikely.153 
Moreover, many key user states, in particular from Asia, are also not members and, unlike in the 
Arctic Council, do not have any participatory status within the OSPAR Commission. 
Options Relating to the Domain of the International L w of the Sea 
As discussed in the above subsection Constraints on the Expansion of the IMO’s 
MandateConstraints on the expansion of IMO’s mandate, there will often be insufficient support 
within the IMO to deal with issues within the domain of the international law of the sea. Such 
issues could be addressed by the Arctic Council, through the ACS or by ad hoc groupings of 
states. For instance, they could develop a collectiv , and thereby uniform, exercise of (residual) 
prescriptive jurisdiction in a flag, coastal or port state capacity. Moreover, there are issues that 
have an impact on jurisdiction over ships in the marine Arctic that could be examined, such as: 




• the legality of the claims to historic title of Canada and the Russian Federation under 
international law;  
• whether or not the transit passage regime applies to (parts of) the Northwest Passage and 
the Northern Sea Route; and 
• the relationship between transit passage and Article 234 of the LOS Convention. 
It may be possible to deal with these issues through an “agreement to disagree,” complemented 
by agreed regulation. Another area for consideration c uld be regional implementation of the 
duties of strait/coastal states and (financial) contributions by user-states towards covering the 
costs of strait/coastal states. The extensive cooperation between strait states and user-states with 
respect to the Straits of Malacca and Singapore could be a model,154 but not necessarily by also 
closely involving IMO in all matters. Certain features of the North Atlantic Ice Patrol established 
under SOLAS 74155 could to some extent be used as a model. 
Conclusions 
As this article has shown, regional regulation of merchant shipping is not inconsistent with the 
LOS Convention and also not inconsistent with the primary role it accords to the IMO. Regional 
regulation could, for instance, take the form of a collective, and thereby uniform, exercise of 
(residual) prescriptive jurisdiction in a flag, coast l or port state capacity. Article 234 of the LOS 
Convention provides a basis for Arctic Ocean coastal tes to impose, individually or 
collectively, types of standards or requirements on foreign ships in lateral passage through their 
maritime zones that are not also laid down in the Polar Code, for example, icebreaker assistance 
or fees,156 as well as more stringent standards or requirements than those laid down in the Polar 
Code, for example, discharge standards. While the adoption or entry into force of the Polar Code 
does not constrain this entitlement as such, it seem  reasonable to argue that it triggers a higher 
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standard of proof for justifying reliance on this entitlement. Arguably, justifying reliance on 
Article 234 would not only be easier when supported by robust data and analyses on risks and 
damage, but also when it involves a collective exercis  by several coastal states and key user 
states have been engaged in a meaningful way. 
It is understandable that the official position by IMO members on regional regulation is that 
this should be avoided in view of the risk it poses to the IMO’s authority. Such a risk is not 
posed by regional implementation of certain IMO instruments, as this is explicitly allowed and 
even encouraged. The Arctic SAR and Arctic MOPPR Agreements negotiated under the auspices 
of the Arctic Council are examples in this regard. Another option the Arctic Council may 
consider is anticipatory regional implementation of IMO instruments that are not yet in force. In 
view of the long overdue entry into force of the BWM Convention, the Arctic Council could join 
the regional seas bodies for the North-East Atlantic Ocean and the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas 
in their joint action on ballast water management standards, to ensure that these standards also 
apply to ships flying the flag of Arctic Council states operating in the marine Arctic.157 
Other domains for which regional action would not lead to incompatibility or conflict with 
IMO output include monitoring, surveillance, inspection, and enforcement. Regional action on 
PSC or on aerial and satellite-based monitoring and surveillance of intentional and accidental 
pollution incidents could be considered. Other opportunities could include: a collective exercise 
of (residual) prescriptive jurisdiction in a flag, coastal or port state capacity; resolving issues 
through an agreement-to-disagree; and regional imple entation of the duties of strait/coastal 
states and (financial) contributions by user-states towards covering the costs of strait/coastal 
states. Such issues could be addressed by the Arctic Council, through the ACS or by ad hoc 
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